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NOTE
REWARDING THIN CAPITALIZATION:
INTEREST RECOVERY DISALLOWED
ON EQUITY INVESTED TO FINANCE
GOVERNMENT CONTRACT CHANGES
In the field of government contracting, the Armed Services Procurement
Regulations (ASPR) and the Federal Procurement Regulations (FPR) set
forth the rules and standard contract clauses by which contractors and the
federal government must abide in their dealings with each other.' Within
these regulations, the standard changes clause 2 allows the Government to
request certain changes in the contractor's performance without causing a
1. See, e.g., Armed Services Procurement Regulations (ASPR) § 7, 32 C.F.R. §§
7-000 to 7-2003.72 (1976); Federal Procurement Regulations (FPR) § 1-7, 41 C.F.R. §§ 17.000 to 1-7.703-25 (1977). Although ASPR and FPR embody substantially similar provisions, ASPR is generally the more progressive of the two, incorporating changes that usually
appear later in FPR. Applicable provisions of the regulations are implied in any contract
when their presence is mandated, even if the prescribed clauses are not expressly in the
contract. G.L. Christian & Assocs. v. United States, 312 F.2d 418 (Ct. Cl.), cert. denied, 375
U.S. 954 (1963). See Shedd, The Christian Doctrine, Force and Effect of Law, and Effect of
Illegality of Government Contracts, 9 PuB. CONT. L.J. 1 (1977). Government contracts are
administered under the procurement regulations and policies in effect at the time the contracts are made. Thus, a contract disputed today will be governed by regulations in effect at
the time of its making, even if that time was decades earlier. See generally Comment, A
Question of Interest: The Government Contractor v. The UnitedStates, 23 AM. U.L. REV. 433
(1973).
2. ASPR § 7-203.2, 32 C.F.R. § 7-203.2 (1976) which provides as follows:
(a) The Contracting Officer may at any time, by written order, and without notice
to the sureties, if any, make changes, within the general scope of this contract, in
any one or more of the following: (i) drawings, designs, or specifications, where
supplies to be furnished are to be specially manufactured for the Government in
accordance therewith; (ii) method of shipment or packing; and (iii) place of delivery.
(b) If any such change causes an increase or decrease in the estimated cost of, or
the time required for, the performance of any part of the work under this contract,
whether changed or not changed by any such order, or otherwise affects any other
provision of this contract, an equitable adjustment shall be made. . . . Any claim
by the Contractor for adjustment under this clause must be asserted within thirty
(30) days from the date of receipt by the Contractor of the notification of change
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breach, 3 as long as these changes were "fairly and reasonably within the
contemplation of the parties when the contract was entered into."'4 Examples of frequently encountered government-caused alterations which come
within the general scope of the contract include substitutions of building
materials, 5 additions to the amount of work to be performed, 6 and government delays in supplying the contractor with specifications or materials
7
necessary for performance.
When a government-caused change within the scope of the contract results in an increase or decrease in the contractor's costs, the contract price8
is adjusted accordingly through a device called an equitable adjustment.
3. See generally R. NASH, GOVERNMENT CONTRACT CHANGES (1975).
4. Freund v. United States, 260 U.S. 60, 63 (1922). Cardinal changes, on the other
hand, are those which involve a substantial deviation from the original bargain made by the
contracting parties, and are not authorized by the standard changes clause. Aragona Constr.
Co. v. United States, 165 Ct. Cl. 382 (1964). A cardinal change is tantamount to an "alteration of the contract itself, a thing that could only be consummated with the consent of both
parties to the contract." General Contracting & Constr. Co. v. United States, 84 Ct. Cl. 570,
580 (1937).
5. Aragona Constr. Co. v. United States, 165 Ct. Cl. 382 (1964); Bruce Constr. Corp. v.
United States, 324 F.2d 516 (Ct. Cl. 1963).
6. Bennett v. United States, 371 F.2d 859 (Ct. Cl. 1967). Bennett involved a contract
for the construction of a river levee which required excavation to be performed by the contractor. The contractor and the contracting officer disagreed in their interpretations of the
amount of excavation required by the contract, the Government demanding more than the
contractor thought necessary. The contractor performed to the Government's satisfaction,
under protest and later filed for an equitable adjustment in the contract price. The court
held that the contractor's interpretation of the contract specifications was reasonable, and
allowed recovery for the added work.
7. Ingalls Shipbuilding Div., Litton Sys., Inc., ASBCA No. 17717, 76-1 BCA T 11,851
(1976). When the Government caused the late delivery of hull steel necessary to build the
nuclear attack submarines for which it had contracted, the contractor was compelled to
qualify additional pipewelders and to subcontract structural assembly work because its
schedule of shifting these workers from one contract to another had been disrupted. Since
the government-caused delays were not worked into the progress payment schedule, the
contractor was forced to invest its own equity capital to cover the additional costs until it
could be compensated through an equitable adjustment.
8. In Bruce Constr. Corp. v. United States, 324 F.2d 516 (Ct. Cl. 1963), equitable adjustments were described as "corrective measures utilized to keep a contractor whole when
the Government modifies a contract." Id. at 518. Cf.United States v. Callahan Walker
Constr. Co., 317 U.S. 56 (1942) (what is fair and equitable is a question of fact). The equitable adjustment in any given case is composed of:
(1) the calculation of the proper amount of costs directly attributable to the work
added by the change order; (2) the deduction of the proper amount of costs directly attributable to the work eliminated by the change order; and (3) the application of oyerhead andprofit to costs directly attributable to the change.
R. NASH, supra note 3, at 352-53 (1975) (emphasis in original). The burden of proof is on
the contractor to show that the change has increased the cost of performance, but the Government bears the burden of proving that the change decreased the cost. Id. at 437-38.
Within thirty days after a change order is received, the contractor must request an equitable
adjustment if it is necessary. ASPR § 7-203.2, 32 C.F.R. § 7-203.2 (1976); 41 C.F.R. § I-
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Although most equitable adjustment claims are settled expeditiously without hearings before the Board of Contract Appeals, cases which do require
protracted mediation may present a financial hardship for the contractor
whose costs have increased, since the contractor is required to continue
performance diligently pending settlement of the dispute. 9 The contractor
is compelled either to invest its own equity capital in the performance of
the change or to borrow the needed capital from a lending institution. In
either case, the contractor must pay for the use of the money, whether
through loss of return on potential investments ("imputed" interest) or
through payment of interest to a lender.' 0
The contractor that attempts to recover such interest expense from the
Government faces several obstacles. Not only has sovereign immunity historically barred recovery from the Government when it would ordinarily
be permitted against private parties, but the allowance of interest against
7.102-2 (1977). The contracting officer (the individual representing the Government in its
dealings with the private contractor) makes a decision regarding the contractor's equitable
adjustment claim. If the contractor is not satisfied with that decision, it may bring its case
before the appropriate Board of Contract Appeals (Board). The Board hearing the case is
determined by the agency under which the contract was originally let. If the contract is with
the Department of Defense, for example, the appropriate Board is the Armed Services
Board of Contract Appeals (ASBCA); if the Department of Agriculture is the federal agency
involved, the appropriate Board is the Department of Agriculture Board of Contract Appeals (AGBCA), and so on.
Pursuant to the standard disputes clause (ASPR §§ 7-103.12, 7-203.2, 32 C.F.R. §§ 7103.12, 7-203.2 (1976); 41 C.F.R. § 1-7.102.12 (1977)), the Board may decide questions of
fact arising under the contract. See United States v. Utah Constr. & Mining Co., 384 U.S.
394 (1966).
The Wunderlich Act, 41 U.S.C. §§ 321, 322 (1976), provides for judicial review of decisions made by the Board. Cases may be appealed to the Court of Claims or to a federal
district court, if the amount in controversy is less than $10,000. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 1346, 1491
(1976). Such cases generally are appealed to the Court of Claims. In any event, the appellate court is bound by the factual record of the Board if the issue involves a governmentcaused change within the general scope of the contract (see text accompanying notes 5-7
supra), but the court may decide issues of fact when the case involves a cardinal change (see
note 4 supra). The Board's conclusions of law are not binding on the Court of Claims.
United States v. Carlo Bianchi & Co., 373 U.S. 709 (1963).
9. ASPR § 7-103.12, 32 C.F.R. § 7-103.12(a) (1976); 41 C.F.R. § 1-7.102-12 (1977)
(disputes clause). For a discussion of situations giving rise to the contractor's lawful abandonment of performance, see Vacketta & Wheeler, A Government Contractor's Right to
Abandon Performance, 65 GEO. L.J. 27 (1976).
10. Both "imputed" interest on the contractor's capital utilized in financing the change
and interest accruing on actual borrowings are referred to as interest in a claim, as distinguished from interest on a claim (interest on the principal amount ultimately awarded by the
Board, from the time that the claim first accrued). Interest on a claim may be recovered
pursuant to the mandatory government contract clause, ASPR § 7-104.82, 32 C.F.R. § 7104.82(a) (1976), which provides that the Government must pay interest on the amount
awarded the contractor pursuant to a claim raised under the disputes clause. See note 9
supra. Recovery of interest in a claim, however, is much more difficult, particularly in the
case of imputed interest. See text accompanying notes II & 12 infra.
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the Government is statutorily confined to situations in which there exists a
specific provision for interest recovery, either in an applicable statute or in
the contract itself."I Recovery of interest on actual borrowings for the performance of changes has been allowed as an additional cost factor, subject
to stringent standards of proof.' 2 Theoretically, the cost to the contractor
is the same, whether through payment of interest to a bank or through the
loss of interest on its own capital. The contractor that finances the increased cost with its own equity capital, however, has traditionally faced
an impossible challenge in attempting to recover interest that it might have
earned had the money been otherwise invested.
The Board of Contract Appeals recently recognized the apparent inequity in permitting recovery for interest on actual borrowings while denying
such recovery for imputed interest on capital invested by the contractor.
In 1976, three cases before the Board raised the question of whether a contractor could recover the imputed interest on invested equity capital when
the capital was used to finance government-caused changes. The Board
held in each case that the interest expense was recoverable, regardless of
whether debt or equity capital was used to finance the changes.1 3 Scarcely
11. "Interest on a claim against the United States shall be allowed in a judgment of the
Court of Claims only under a contract or Act of Congress expressly providing for payment
thereof." 28 U.S.C. § 2516(a) (1976). Though specifically directed to the Court of Claims,
this rule is observed by all judicial bodies. United States v. Seaboard Air Line Ry., 280 F.
349 (4th Cir. 1922), rev'd on other grounds, 261 U.S. 299 (1923). Though embodying the
sovereign immunity doctrine in its policy, the applicability of this section to interest in equitable adjustments has been questioned. See Bell v. United States, 404 F.2d 975 (Ct. Cl.
1968); Tuason Constr. Co., ASBCA No. 5106, 59-1 BCA 2266 (1959). Nevertheless, the
Court of Claims has espoused such an application. See, e.g., J.D. Hedin Constr. Co. v.
United States, 456 F.2d 1315 (Ct. Cl. 1972); Ramsey v. United States, 101 F. Supp. 353 (Ct.
Cl. 1951), cert. denied, 343 U.S. 977 (1952). Interest on government delays in payment when
the contract provides for progress payments has historically been denied, absent express
contractual or statutory provision to the contrary. See Komatsu Mfg. Co. v. United States,
132 Ct. Cl. 314 (1955); Ramsey v. United States, 101 F. Supp. 353 (Ct. Cl. 1951), cert. denied,
343 U.S. 977 (1952); Myerle v. United States, 33 Ct. Cl. 1 (1897). One reason given for this
proscription is "public convenience," which in turn springs from the sovereign immunity
doctrine. Ramsey v. United States, 101 F. Supp. at 356.
12. See, e.g., Bell v. United States, 404 F.2d 975 (Ct. Cl. 1968); Drexel Dynamics Corp.,
ASBCA Nos. 9502, 9617, 9793 & 10608, 67-2 BCA 6410 (1967); Lake Union Drydock Co.,
ASBCA No. 3073, 59-1 BCA 2229 (1959); accord, Sun Elec. Corp., ASBCA No. 13031, 702 BCA 8371 (1970). Progress toward an equitable standard of interest recovery has been
sporadic. Compare Bell v. United States, 404 F.2d 975 (Ct. Cl. 1968) (landmark decision
permitting the recovery of interest on money borrowed to perform government-caused
changes) with Drexel Dynamics Corp., ASBCA Nos. 9502, 9617, 9793 & 10608, 67-2 BCA
6410 (1967) and Lake Union Drydock Co., ASBCA No. 3073, 59-1 BCA 2229 (1959)
(Board level pre-Bell exceptions to the rule prohibiting recovery of interest on borrowings to
perform government-caused changes). Cf. G.M. Mfg. Co., ASBCA No. 5345, 60-1 BCA
2576 (1960) (interest disallowed in circumstances similar to those in Bell).
13. Fischbach & Moore Int'l Corp., ASBCA No. 18146, 77-1 BCA 12,300 (1976); New
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a year later, however, in Framlau Corp. v. United States, 14 the Court of
Claims strongly indicated that it would decline to follow these recent
Board decisions. Basing its decision solely on a near-sighted apprehension
that the value of the use of equity capital is too difficult to ascertain,' 5 the
court indicated that it would once again refuse to allow interest recovery
on the contractor's invested capital.
The artificial distinction between debt and equity capital can mean a
difference of millions of dollars for government contractors.' 6 Thus,
Framlau portends significant hardship for those contractors which must
finance increased costs with their own equity capital. In reverting to the
inequitable differentiation between actual borrowings and capital investment, Framlau curtails the Board's progress toward a realistic and just recovery policy.
I.

EMERGENCE OF INTEREST RECOVERY

Until as recently as 1955, recovery of interest against the Government
was permitted only in the narrow circumstances set forth by statute' 7 or
in claims involving a government action which constituted a "taking"
under the Government's eminent domain power.18 In Wichita Engineering
York Shipbuilding Co., ASBCA No. 16164, 76-2 BCA 111,979 (1976); Ingalls Shipbuilding
Div., Litton Sys., Inc., ASBCA No. 17717, 76-1 BCA 11,851 (1976). See notes 37-63 and
accompanying text infra.
14. 568 F.2d 687 (Ct. Cl. 1977). See notes 64-69 and accompanying text infra.
15. See text accompanying note 69 infra.
16. In New York Shipbuilding Co., ASBCA No. 16164, 76-2 BCA $ 11,979 (1976), the
Armed Services Board of Contract Appeals awarded the contractor in excess of four million
dollars in the form of an added profit factor to compensate it for increased use of equity
capital. 76-2 BCA at 57,449; see generaly text accompanying notes 45-59 infra.
17. 28 U.S.C. § 2516(a) (1976). See note IIsupra.
18. United States v. Thayer-West Point Hotel Co., 329 U.S. 585 (1947). Cf.Mar-Pak
Corp., 203 Ct. Cl. 718 (1973) (fifth amendment "taking" standard continues to be used as
one method of interest recovery). If a "taking" is found, the contractor must be made whole
through 'Just compensation." This concept includes the payment of interest from the date
of the "taking" to the date the principal is paid. 329 U.S. at 588.
Prior to 1955, the only other indication that interest against the Government might be
allowed appeared in W. Horace Williams Co., BCA Nos. 86 & 212, 1 Cont. Cas. Fed. 348,
354 (1943). There, the Board of Contract Appeals announced that interest paid on lost debt
or equity capital "may be considered as a factor in calculating the equitable adjustment to
be made in the fixed fee." I Cont. Cas. Fed. at 354. Citing no authority for this then-novel
principle, the Board limited its application to borrowings or additional capital specifically
used for the performance of the increased work, and excluded interest on "increased actual
over estimated costs." Id. This 1943 decision did not, however, represent an advance in
interest recovery. The Board expressly noted that interest was not recoverable as such, but
indicated that interest paid on borrowings might influence the Board toward a more
favorable award to the contractor in other, allowable areas of recovery, such as profit. See
New York Shipbuilding Co., ASBCA No. 16164, 76-2 BCA at 57,431-32.
Board cases draw important distinctions among the various forms of recovery of interest
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Co. ,19 the Armed Services Board of Contract Appeals permitted recovery
of interest on actual borrowings as a General and Administrative cost 20 in
a price redetermination contract 2' when the contractor was able to prove
that the interest expense was reasonable, necessary, and allocable to the
performance of the contract.2 2 The decision was based upon a Department of Defense policy which provided for the recovery of interest on borrowings as part of a fixed price redeterminable contract. 23 The interest in
Wichita, however, was incurred on borrowings necessary to finance performance of the original contract terms, and no government-caused
changes in performance were involved.
A 1959 revision in the Armed Services Procurement Regulations appeared to blunt any effect Wichita might have had on future case law by
prohibiting recovery of interest in fixed price contracts. 24 With few exceptions, 25 then, interest recovery was not permitted for financing governin equitable adjustments. Interest is not recoverable in the form of damages for a government delay in payment. J.D. Hedin Constr. Co. v. United States, 456 F.2d 1315 (Ct. Cl.
1972); Ramsey v. United States, 101 F. Supp. 353 (Ct. Cl. 1951); Myerle v. United States, 33
Ct. Cl. 1 (1897). It may be recoverable as a direct contract cost, Roscoe-Ajax Constr. Co.,
ASBCA No. 12110, 71-1 BCA 1 8828 (1971), or as an overhead expense, Lavoie Labs., Inc.,
ASBCA No. 3796, 59-1, BCA 2071 (1959); Wichita Eng'r Co., ASBCA No. 2522, 6 Cont.
Cas. Fed. 61,804 (1955). Finally, interest prohibitions may be circumvented by allowing
recovery of extra profit rather than actual interest as in New York Shipbuilding.
19. ASBCA No. 2522, 6 Cont. Cas. Fed. 61,804 (1955).
20. In the field of government contracting, overhead costs are commonly referred to as
General and Administrative expenses or "G & A." See, e.g., ASPR § 15-203(c), 32 C.F.R.
§ 15-203(c) (1976). In Wichita, interest expense on actual borrowings was incurred when the
time necessary to repair 1,000 cargo trucks increased from four months to eight months.
21. Price redetermination contracts contain a provision allowing the revision of the
stated contract price during the course of performance. This device is employed when the
actual cost of performance cannot be determined in advance; the Government and the contractor agree to revise prices in a single contract such that an equitable result is reached. The
price may be either increased or decreased, with the purpose of the redetermination provision being to increase efficiency and reduce costs. See 2 J. McBRIDE & I. WACHTEL, GovERNMENT CONTRACTS § 20.10 (1975).
22. Wichita Eng'r Co., ASBCA No. 2522, 6 Cont. Cas. Fed. 61,804 (1955).
23. The policy upon which Wichita relied was a recent revision in the Armed Services
Procurement Regulations. Since the ASPR proscription of recovery of interest on money
borrowed to finance performance did not apply to fixed price redetermination contracts,
interest was allowable. See J. CIBINIC, COST DETERMINATION 98 (George Washington Uni-

versity Monograph No. 8, 1964).
24. See ASPR § 15-.205.17, 25 Fed. Reg. 14298 (1960) (current version at 32 C.F.R.
§ 15-205.17 (1977)). Interest could no longer be recovered as part of General and Administrative expense as it had been in Wichita and its progeny. E.g., Gibbs Shipyards, Inc.,
ASBCA No. 9998, 67-2 BCA 1 6458 (1967); Lavoie Labs., Inc., ASBCA No. 3796, 59-1 BCA
T 2071 (1959). Gibbs followed Wichita because the contract in dispute had been entered into
prior to the 1959 ASPR revision and was thus subject to pre-1959 ASPR policy. See note I
.supra.

25. See Drexel Dynamics Corp., ASBCA Nos. 9502, 9617, 9793 & 10608, 67-2 RCA
6410 (1967); Lake Union Drydock Co., ASBCA No. 3073, 59-1 BCA 2229 (1959) (pre-Bell
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ment-mandated changes until the Court of Claims' 1968 decision in Bell v.
United States.26 Bell involved a contract for the manufacture of
parachutes for the Department of Defense. Although the contractor produced the parachutes in compliance with government specifications, several lots were rejected because they failed a government ballistic test, the
passing of which was not a prerequisite to acceptance under the terms of
the contract. Pending resolution of the ensuing performance difficulties,
the Government ordered a production slowdown, costing the contractor
added interest expense on the $450,000 it had borrowed to finance the project. The contractor subsequently filed a claim for an equitable adjustment
because of the added expense involved in this constructive change.
In allowing the claim, the court in Bell apparently ignored the 1959
ASPR revision prohibiting interest recovery in fixed price contracts.2 7 Instead, it extended the old policy allowing interest in equitable adjustment
claims under fixed price redetermination contracts 28 to include interest expense incurred on actual borrowings to perform government-caused
changes. The court also dismissed the statutory prohibition against recovery of interest 29 as a bar to its decision, holding that the statute applied
only to breach claims (i e., claims for delay in payment). 30 Given this limitation, the statute would no longer bar recovery of interest on borrowings
to finance changes. 3' Failure to establish the necessary elements of proof
set forth in Wichita,32 however, could continue to bar this type of interest
recovery. 33 After Bell, the contractor had to segregate the interest expense
incurred as a result of government-caused changes from the added interest
exceptions allowing recovery of interest on actual borrowings). Cf. Hardeman-MonierHutcherson, ASBCA No. 13188, 68-2 BCA 7400 (1968), where the Board held that interest
on actual borrowings necessitated by government-caused delays was recoverable as part of
General and Administrative expense, rather than as a cost, when proof of allocability was
insufficient.
26. 404 F.2d 975 (Ct. Cl. 1968).

27. See text accompanying note 25 supra. The 1959 revision was apparently not recognized as binding by the Board. See Comment, supra note 1, at 437 n.13.
28. See text accompanying note 23 supra.
29. See note I1 and accompanying text supra.

30. Reasoning that the claim in Bell was not based upon a delay in payment (a breach
claim), but rather upon a government-caused change compensable under the changes clause
(see note 2 supra), the Board focused on the purpose and scope of that clause. The Board
found that since the extra interest expense was incurred as a direct result of the governmentcaused change, it was "an increased cost of contract performance attributable to the
change," and was thus compensable under the changes clause. 404 F.2d at 984.
31. Among the Board decisions following in the wake of Bell are: Keco Indus., Inc.,
ASBCA No. 16645, 72-1 BCA 9470 (1972); Roscoe-Ajax Constr. Co., ASBCA No. 12110,
71-1 BCA 1 8828 (1971); Oxford Corp., ASBCA Nos. 12298 & 12299, 69-2 BCA
7871
(1969).

32. See note 22 and accompanying text supra.
33. LTV Electrosys., Inc., ASBCA No. 14832, 75-1 BCA

11,310 (1975); Edgar M.
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expense resulting from nonrecoverable changes in performance, such as
35
inclement weather 34 or contractor-management problems.
The Bell inroads to interest recovery on changes notwithstanding, recovery of imputed interest on investment of equity capital continued to be
denied. 36 Nearly a decade later, however, three cases came before the
Board of Contract Appeals which briefly altered interest recovery policy.
This triad of cases developed the proposition that a contractor investing its
own capital to perform government-mandated changes has the right to recover a return on its investment. )ngalls Shipbuilding Division, Litton Systems, Inc.,37 the first of these cases, involved a contract for the construction
of government submarines. The Government extended the time for contractor performance, disrupted the contractor's work and payment schedule, and caused other delays by delivering necessary materials either late
or out of sequence. Progress payments were withheld during the period of
the time extension. The Board held that the contractor was entitled to
recover the interest it could have earned had the payments been made at
the originally scheduled time because this added cost to the contractor resulted from a government action. 38 The Board commented as follows:
[w]hether the amount involved would have been used to reduce
borrowings for the costs of performing this contract or whether it
would have been used for other purposes unconnected with this
contract is immaterial. The loss of use of the money was a detriment to appellant regardless of what that use would probably
have been. 39
Contrasting Ingalls with a 1947 case involving a government delay in
payment, 4° the Board noted a crucial difference. In the earlier case, the
Board found that the Government's taking of hotel properties was not a
"taking" under its eminent domain power. Therefore, the subsequent failure to pay the full amount due at the time designated for payment constituted a breach. The issue accordingly became whether there was a specific
contractual or statutory provision allowing payment of interest on the
amount owed. 4 ' In Ingalls, however, the Board expressly found that the
Williams, Gen. Contractor, ASBCA Nos. 16058, 16237, 16305, 16306, 16381 & 16617, 72-2
BCA $ 9734 (1972); Sun Elec. Corp., ASBCA No. 13031, 70-2 BCA T 8371 (1970).
34. Phillips Constr. Co., ASBCA Nos. 5831, 6052 & 6074, 70-1 BCA 8248 (1970).

35. Midlands Community Action Agency, Inc., GSBCA No. LD-17, 73-1 BCA

9790

(1972); Manuel M. Liodas, ASBCA No. 12829, 71-2 BCA T 9015 (1971).

36. See, e.g., Oxford Corp., ASBCA Nos. 12298 & 12299, 69-2 BCA
37.

ASBCA No. 17717, 76-1 BCA T 11,851 (1976).

38.
39.
40.
41.

Id. at 56,778.
Id.
United States v. Thayer-West Point Hotel Co., 329 U.S. 585 (1947).
329 U.S. at 588-89. See notes 11 & 18 supra.

7871 (1969).
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Government's extended performance schedule was not a breach, but
rather that the payment delays were specifically authorized by the contract.
Since the claim in Ingalls was not prompted by a government breach, the
contractor was not barred by the statutory prohibition on interest recovery. 42 The Board determined that the claim involved government-caused
change and allowed recovery of imputed interest on the added capital nec43
essary to continue performance.
The Board also had no difficulty in assigning a rate of return on the
contractor's invested capital. Since the contractor had incurred actual borrowings as well as investing its own equity capital, the Board used the
interest rates paid on the borrowed capital as the proper rate to be recovered as imputed interest on invested capital. 44
Ingalls paved the way for the most far-reaching of the triad of 1976
Board decisions, New York Shipbuilding Co. 45 Drawing upon Ingalls, and
citing scraps of dicta and cases allowing compensation for actual borrowings made, 46 the Board held that "[tlhe contractor who invests private capital in a contract must be compensated fairly for the loss of the opportunity
to invest that money elsewhere."' 47 The case involved seven fixed price
contracts to be financed by the Government, but due to government42. See Ingalls Shipbuilding Div., Litton Sys., Inc., ASBCA No. 17717, 76-1 BCA
11,851 at 56,778 (1976); text accompanying notes 29-30 supra.
43. See ASBCA No. 17717, 76-1 BCA 11,851 at 56,776-78.
44. Id. The Board permitted recovery of imputed interest as a separate cost item in the
equitable adjustment. Although ASPR § 15-713.7, 32 C.F.R. § 15-713.7 (1976) forbids recovery of interest as a cost, this principle was not made applicable to fixed price contracts
until May 15, 1970, when Defense Procurement Circular (DPC) 79 was issued. The ASPR
cost principles (ASPR § 15, 32 C.F.R. § 15 (1976)), therefore, do not apply to contracts
entered into prior to the issuance of DPC 79. See note I supra. The Ingalls contract falls
within this category.
45. ASBCA No. 16164, 76-2 BCA 11,979 (1976).
46. Keco Indus., Inc., ASBCA Nos. 15184 & 15547, 72-2 BCA 9576 (1972) (to equalize the treatment of investing and borrowing contractors, the former should receive a higher
profit because it will not be able to recover imputed interest); Oxford Corp., ASBCA Nos.
12298 & 12299, 69-2 BCA T 7871 (1969) (since imputed interest is not recoverable, contractor should be allowed a profit sufficiently high to produce an equitable result); Drexel Dynamics Corp., ASBCA Nos. 9502, 9617, 9793 & 10608, 67-2 BCA 6531 (1967) (pre-Bell
exception allowing recovery of interest on actual borrowings); Walter Motor Truck Co.,
ASBCA No. 8054, 66-1 BCA 5365, at 25,173 (1966) ("The borrower should get no more
than the contractor who employes [sic] his own capital."); H.K. Ferguson Co., ASBCA No.
2826, 57-1 BCA 1293 (1957) (recognition of the increased cost of using money over a
longer period of time); W. Horace Williams Co., BCA Nos. 86 & 212, 1 Cont. Cas. Fed. 348
(1943) (imputed interest may be considered in computing an equitable adjustment to be
made to a fixed fee).
11,979, at 57,428
47. New York Shipbuilding Co., ASBCA No. 16164, 76-2 BCA
(1976) (emphasis in original).
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caused constructive changes and delays in pricing, the contractor was compelled to invest its own capital in order to continue performance.
Reasoning that the equity capital would otherwise have been invested in
conservative, interest-bearing accounts, the Board held that the contractor
was entitled to "some fair return for the use of private capital on govern'48
ment work, over and above his direct contribution to the work itself."
The Board distinguished lost interest on investment from the traditionally
proscribed award of lost anticipated profit by characterizing the former as
a loss of opportunity to invest and by highlighting the inequity of paying
the same price to two contractors, one of which receives progress payments
49
while the other invests its own money.
Although the Board's careful analysis of the equities in New York
Shipbuilding was framed in terms of interest recovery, the award was ultimately made in the form of an added profit factor. 50 Citing a Department
of Defense statement of policy on profit,5 I the Board emphasized the Government's desire to "reward contractors who provide their own facilities
and financing" through the element of profit. 52 The Board repeatedly
stressed the need to give the contractor a fair return on its investment when
equity capital was used to finance government-caused changes, and it used
profit in the equitable adjustment as the vehicle to reach the desired result:
By allowing compensation for the use of private capital, not
automatically as a cost, but rather in profit . . . ,we are doing
essentially the same thing that parties do when they negotiate a
profit in initial contract pricing that includes a fair return for the
use of whatever private capital the contractor will invest in the
53
contract work.
The Board relied on fragmentary dicta to support its statement that
profit is the usual means of compensation for use of equity capital, 54 and
reasoned that the profit award was consistent with Department of Defense
policy. 55 Although the contractor had requested an award of imputed in48. Id.
49. Id. at 57,427-28.

50. Id. at 57,435-38. Equitable adjustments are broken down into costs and profit.
Costs include direct labor, equipment, and overhead, while the profit award consists of profit
on the additional expenses incurred as a result of the government-caused change. See R.
NASH, supra note 3, at 352.

51. ASPR § 3-808.1, 32 C.F.R. § 3-808.1 (1976).
52. New York Shipbuilding Co., ASBCA No. 16164, 76-2 BCA
11,979, at 57,430
(1976) (quoting ASPR § 3-808.1(b)(iv), 32 C.F.R. § 3-808.1(b)(iv) (1977)).
53. New York Shipbuilding Co., ASBCA No. 16164, 76-2 BCA 11,979, at 57,435. The
Board expressly declined to address the issue of recoverability of interest as a cost, stating
that it need not be decided in order to settle the claim at hand. Id. at 57,438.
54. Id. at 57,434. See, e.g., cases cited note 46 supra.
55. See authority cited note 51 supra.
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terest in the form of profit as an alternative argument, its major argument
was that imputed interest should be awarded as a cost. 56 The Board, however, declined to decide the issue of imputed interest on that ground, characterizing its as a difficult and controversial question. 57 Noting that under
Bell, the statutory prohibition against the recovery of interest from the
Government applied only to breach claims and not to interest on borrowings to finance changes, 58 the Board had no difficulty in bypassing the
traditional bar to interest recovery since a breach claim was not involved. 59
Less than six months later, the Board decided Fischbach& Moore InternationalCorp.60 In Fischbach, the contractor was denied interest recovery
on actual borrowings because it failed to prove that its borrowings were
made specifically to finance government-caused changes. Nevertheless,
the contractor was awarded an additional profit factor since it used its own
equity capital to finance the cost of performance delays. Citing New York
Shipbuilding as precedent, and reiterating the contractor's entitlement to
compensation for the use of its capital,6 ' the Board allowed recovery in the
62
form of additional profit although proper allocation had not been shown.
Sufficient evidence was found on which to base a reasonable estimate of
the principal amount recoverable, and the Board awarded a six percent
return on this amount. 63 Thus, not only was the contractor awarded a
return on its investment, but the award was made in the absence of the
proof traditionally required for recovery.
56. To support this claim, the contractor met the Bell standard of proof, see text accompanying notes 37-38 supra, by segregating its investments to finance government-caused
changes from its other, nonrecoverable, equity investments. See ASPR § 15-703.1(a), 32
C.F.R. § 15-703.1(a) (1976).
11,979 at 57,438,
57. New York Shipbuilding Co., ASBCA No. 16164, 76-2 BCA
57,457 (1976).

58. See text accompanying notes 29 & 30 supra.
59. See New York Shipbuilding Co., ASBCA No. 16164, 76-2 BCA 11,979, at 57,440.
See generally note 11 and accompanying text supra.
12,300 (1976).
60. ASBCA No. 18146, 77-1 BCA
61. Id. at 59,248.
62. Id.
63. Id. at 59,248-49. In arriving at this determination, the Board relied on the "jury
verdict" method.
This term reflects the fact that frequently.. . courts and boards must weight the
probative value of the various estimates that are placed into evidence and arrive at
a judgment as to the amount of the equitable adjustment that should be given in
view of the conflicting testimony and proof that has been introduced. In performing this task of weighting the evidence, they see themselves functioning in the role
of a jury arriving at a verdict, and this does appear to be a relatively accurate
reflection of the process that occurs.
R. NASH, supra note 3, at 441. The six percent award was derived from a reasonable estimate, based on all the surrounding circumstances of the contract, as viewed by the Board.
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IMPUTED INTEREST DISALLOWED

The triad of decisions permitting interest recovery on capital used to
finance government-caused changes had reigned for only one year when
the Court of Claims denounced it in Framlau Corp. v. United States.64
Framlau involved a contract for the construction of a Naval Reserve
Training Center. Due to delays in posting performance bonds, strikes, inclement weather, and disputes over the meaning of certain language in the
contract, the cost of performance increased substantially. The contractor
sought an equitable adjustment, including delay costs and interest on borrowings for changed work.
Since the borrowings were made to finance both contractor and government-caused expense, the contractor was required to segregate the borrowings for each. 6 5 This it failed to do, and the Board of Contract Appeals
denied the interest claim. 66 On motion for summary judgment in the
Court of Claims, the contractor, realizing it had failed to meet its burden
of proof before the Board, urged that the triad rule be espoused and the
Bell standard abandoned. 67 In effect, the contractor asked the court to
extend the doctrine of the three Board decisions by allowing recovery of
interest regardless of whether imputed or actual, without the necessity of
allocating those borrowings specifically used for government-caused
changes. 68 Although Framlau's argument of last resort was tenuous at
best, the Court of Claims seized the opportunity to comment on the triad
holdings and reasoning. The court expressly declined to abandon the Bell
standard of proof for recovery of interest on actual borrowings. Furthermore, rather than extend the triad doctrine as Framlau requested, the
court completely rejected the reasoning upon which the Board cases were
based, and instead reached the following conclusion:
It may be argued that differing treatment of debt and equity capital follows an artificial distinction and that it rewards thin capitalization, but we. . . believe that the distinction is supported by
reason in that the cost to the contractor of borrowing capital is
him of the use of equity
clearly determinable, while the value to
69
capital is not so readily ascertainable.
Thus, the Framlau court disapproved the Board decisions allowing recov64. 568 F.2d 687 (Ct. CI. 1977).
65. Framlau Corp., ASBCA No. 14666, 72-1 BCA $ 9279 (1972) (citing Phillips Constr.
Co., ASBCA Nos. 5831, 6052 & 6074, 70-1 BCA 8248 (1970)).
66. Framlau Corp., ASBCA No. 14666, 72-1 BCA 9279 at 43,005.

67. 568 F.2d at 694; see text accompanying notes 34-35 supra.
68. The contractor's argument here was apparently based on the Board's liberal treatment of the interest issue, particularly Fischbach & Moore's "jury verdict" approach to recovery without detailed and complete proof. See note 63 and accompanying text supra.
69. 568 F.2d at 694-95.
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ery of imputed interest even though the case at issue did not present that
specific issue for adjudication. In one paragraph, the Court of Claims toppled the three lengthy Board decisions and discarded the thoughtful logic
upon which the Board based equal treatment of borrower and investor.
III.

IMPUTED INTEREST: IS IT CALCULABLE?

The basic source of disagreement between the Court of Claims and the
Board centers on the problem of calculating the value of capital which the
contractor is compelled to invest to finance government-caused changes.
70
The court in Framlau flatly stated that it is not "readily ascertainable.
The Board in New York Shipbuilding, however, proclaimed that recovery
would be a "fair return" on the investment instead of actual lost earnings,
since a claim for lost earnings would too closely resemble anticipatory
7
profit which is traditionally proscribed. '
In its search for precedent to support the equal treatment of borrower
and investor, the Board in New York Shiubuidding found several cases
which discussed the value of the use of money.72 In Ingalls, the Board
recognized that "money is readily susceptible of use to make money," and
that "the marketplace attributes a value to the use of money . . . regardless of whether it could be proved that that money would otherwise necessarily have earned a return elsewhere. '73 Similarly, in a 1974 decision the
Board stated that "money is a valuable commodity. Obtaining its use for
74
any purpose costs something and in recent years that cost has been high."
Other cases suggested that borrowing and investing contractors should receive the same recovery, but they lacked any valid precedent on which to
75
base this notion.
70. See text accompanying note 69 supra.
71. New York Shipbuilding Co., ASBCA No. 16164, 76-2 BCA
(1976).

11,979, at 57,427

72. Ingalls Shipbuilding Div., Litton Sys., Inc., ASBCA No. 17717, 76-1 BCA 1 11,851

(1976); Aerojet-Gen. Corp., ASBCA No. 17171, 74-2 BCA 110,863 (1974); Drexel Dynamics Corp., ASBCA Nos. 9502, 9617, 9793 & 10608, 67-2 BCA

6410 (1967).

73. New York Shipbuilding Co., ASBCA No. 16164, 76-2 BCA 1 11,979, at 57,428
(1976) (quoting Ingalls Shipbuilding Div., Litton Sys., Inc., ASBCA No. 17717, 76-1 BCA
11,851 at 56,778 (1976)).
74. Aerojet-Gen. Corp., ASBCA No. 17171, 74-2 BCA 110,863, at 51,683 (1974), quoted
in New York Shipbuilding Co., ASBCA No. 16164, 76-2 BCA 1 11,979, at 57,423-24 (1976).

75. Walter Motor Truck Co., ASBCA No. 8054, 66-1 BCA 1 5365 (1966), involved a
fixed price redeterminable contract, and discussed the expense elements to be considered in

arriving at a revised price. In New York Shipbuilding, the Board extracted Walter Motor's

statement that an investing contractor should not be penalized because it did not borrow.
The Board in New York Shiobuilding also pointed to the fleeting reference in W. Horace

Williams Co., BCA Nos. 86 & 212, 1 Cont. Cas. Fed. 348 (1943) to the interest issue. In that
case, the Board indicated the additional capital needed for changes should be considered as
a factor in calculating the equitable adjustment regardless of whether borrowed or invested.
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In New York Shipbuilding, the Board indicated that a recovery for loss
of use of equity capital would have to be conservative because any investment involves some risk, however small.76 In the actual computation, the
Board noted that both the contractor and the Government had based their
figures on the rate of return realized on the contractor's actual investments
during the time period in question, although the Government arrived at a
lower figure. The Board relegated actual investments to a minor evidentiary role which would not be considered automatically in other situations;
nevertheless, the Board accepted the investments as the basis of its computation because both parties had used them and because the results
achieved by each party were conservative. 77 By resolving the computation
issue in this manner, the Board failed to present a means of calculation
which could be used in future cases involving imputed interest. The problem reflects the very core of the Framlau court's dissatisfaction with the
triad reasoning. 78 Thus, because the calculation adopted by the Board in
New York Shipbuildingwas somewhat arbitrary and could not be relied on
in future cases, 79 the case perpetuated the more liberal trend toward recovery of imputed interest begun by Ingalls, while permitting recovery on investments without offering a concrete method of calculation.
In contrast, Ingalls fixed the rate of return on invested capital as the rate
paid on borrowings. 80 This method is obviously not suitable for universal
usage, however, because the contractor will not always have borrowings
that may be looked to for a rate of return on equity capital. Fischbach &
Moore's "jury verdict" approach 8' leaves even more room for uncertainty
because no specific formula was used to compute the award for imputed
interest. Rather, the result depended on the Board's discretion in light of
all the facts in the case. Thus, the triad left the Framlau court with grave
doubts regarding the method for calculating the value of lost opportunity
to invest equity capital.
After Fischbach & Moore, it is unclear precisely how specific the proofs
for recovery of imputed interest must be. This issue also troubled the
Court of Claims because such proofs guarantee that the contractor will not
receive a windfall. When the contractor must show that actual borrowings82 for performance of contract changes were necessary and reasonable,
76. New York Shipbuilding Co., ASBCA No. 16164, 76-2 BCA

(1976).
77.
78.
79.
80.
81.
82.

Id. at 57,448.
See text accompanying note 69 supra.
See text accompanying note 77 supra.
See text accompanying note 44 supra.
See note 63 supra.
In New York Shipbuilding Co., ASBCA No. 16164, 76-2 BCA

11,979, at 57,427

11,979, at 57,434
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it is effectively required to calculate the interest and to show that money
was not spent unnecessarily. In Framlau, the Court of Claims rejected the
Board triad because the leeway the Board was willing to extend the contractor appeared to promote an insufficient check on the amount of recovery.
Notwithstanding its spontaneous treatment of the subject in Framlau,
the Court of Claims appears hesitant to analyze carefully the equities involved in the separate treatment accorded borrowing contractors and investing contractors. This conclusion is suggested by the limited nature of
the discussion in Framlau, as well as by the court's treatment of the issue in
a decision handed down on the same day, Singer Co., LibrascopeDivision
v. United States.8 3 In Singer, the contractor sought, as part of the equitable adjustment, a recovery of its interest expense incurred through borrowings made necessary by government-caused changes. 84 The corporate
structure of the contractor was such that it borrowed from another level
within the corporation, which in turn borrowed generally from lending institutions to finance its operations. The contractor was required to show
that the short-term borrowing needs of the corporation increased over the
85
amount usually borrowed to finance its normal corporate operations.
Failing to meet this burden at the trial level, the contractor was denied
86
interest recovery.
Before a three-judge appeals panel in the Court of Claims, the contrac(1976), the Board cited LTV Electrosys., Inc., ASBCA No. 14832, 75-1 BCA 11,310 (1975)
as authority for the requirement that loans be necessary and allocable to the contract in
order to recover interest expense. Luzon Stevedoring Corp., ASBCA No. 11650, 68-2 BCA
7193 (1968), set forth a scheme for determining whether the interest rates paid were reasonable. The Board suggested that the following be considered: "(1) the nature of the risk, (2)
the terms (time period) of the various loan transactions, (3) rates paid by other borrowers on
comparable time loans having a risk potential similar to that of appellant, and (4) the state
of the economy within which the loan or loans were made." Id. at 33,386.
83. 568 F.2d 695 (Ct. Cl. 1977). It should be noted that both cases were heard before

Senior Judge Laramore.
84. The contractor alleged that the Government ordered numerous changes in the plans
and specifications for the production of a data processing subsystem, causing the contractor
increased expense and raising the amount of borrowings it would normally need to make.
Id. at 698, 718.
85. Id. at 718. See Aerojet-Gen. Corp., ASBCA No. 17171, 74-2 BCA
10,863, at
57,689 (1974).
86. 568 F.2d at 720. The contractor argued that the case was "on all fours" with Aerojet-Gen. Corp., ASBCA No. 17171, 74-2 BCA 10,863 (1974). In Aerojet, the Government
wrongfully withheld progress payments due the contractor for its production of missile motors. Although the contractor, whose corporate borrowing scheme was the same as that of
Singer, failed to establish a direct relationship between specific borrowings and the amount
of the withheld progress payments, recovery of interest was allowed on the actual increase
over regular borrowings. The Singer court distinguished Aerojet, however, indicating that in
Aerojet, the contractor offered "specific and detailed evidence showing in positive fashion
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tor, using essentially the same tactic as the contractor in Framlau, argued
that the triad doctrine eliminated the necessity of proving allocation of
actual borrowings to specific changes mandated by the Government.8 7 In
affirming per curiam the ruling of the trial judge, the panel declined to
address the imputed interest problem treated in New York Shipbuilding
because it had not been presented before the Board of Contract Appeals.
The court characterized the triad issue as "not without its difficulties...
in view of the ancient doctrine disallowing interest against the Government ....*88 Nonetheless, it declined to offer further comment on the
subject and concluded that the Singer decision rested on the contractor's
failure to properly allocate its borrowings. 89 The court acknowledged that
Framlau established a precedent regarding imputed interest recovery, and
noted that the court had "grapple[d]" with the problem in that case. 90
Since Framlau's brief treatment of the three Board decisions, however,
could scarcely be characterized as a thorough analysis of the equities involved in the denial of imputed interest, Singer's disposal of the issue is a
curious one. In a display of reluctance to confront the problem, the Singer
court chose to sidestep the issue, instead indicating that the Framlau decision is definitive.
If the dictum in Framlau is indeed followed, then, the Government will
continue to discriminate against self-financed contractors. Those able to
afford to forego bank loans for government-caused changes will suffer at
the equitable adjustment stage. The Court of Claims conceded that the
distinction between debt and equity capital is an artificial one which "rewards thin capitalization,' but found these arguments inadequate to outweigh the statutory bar and the absence of a concrete formula for
computing lost interest on capital.92 The contractor receives no incentive
to avoid debt when financing government-caused changes.
Interest expense is a real cost to the contractor whether equity capital or
a loan is used to finance changes. 93 If the Court of Claims had carefully
that, as a consequence of the Government's action, the corporation's short term borrowing
needs were increased." 568 F.2d at 720.
87. 568 F.2d at 698.
88. Id.

89. Id.
90. Id.
91. Id. at 695.
92. Id. The statutory prohibition was applicable here because the claim was for a government payment delay, characterized in Bell as a "breach claim." See text accompanying
note 30 supra.
93. See Aerojet-Gen. Corp., ASBCA No. 17171, 74-2 BCA T 10,863, at 51,683 (1974).
Normally, the contractor uses available funds to perform other contracts. Where these funds
are tied up in government changes, however, the contractor is unable to undertake other
projects because its capital base has been reduced. Id. at 51,685.
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analyzed the practical effect of the double standard of interest recovery, a
possible solution to the computation problem might have been suggested.
The Singer court's tacit approval of Framlau's rationale indicates a hesitancy to confront the issue and establishes Framlau as a "stopgap" device
which avoids further analysis.
The computation solution, however, is not necessarily as elusive as the
court has characterized it. An examination of an area in which interest is
recoverable may shed some light on the matter. The court might consider
the rate of interest it customarily allows in cases involving interest on a
claim, i.e., interest recoverable on the principalamount of the award ultimately allowed against the Government. 94 The Armed Services Procurement Regulations refer to recovery of this interest at a statutory rate,
periodically updated by Congress.9 5 The award of interest on a claim
serves the same purpose as an award of imputed interest on invested equity
capital because both compensate the contractor for the use of its money.
Awards of interest on a claim take into account the interest the contractor
could have earned had there been no delay from the time the principal
award accrued and the time it was received by the contractor. Analytically, the deprivation of use of money suffered by the contractor pending
settlement of its claim does not differ significantly from investment of equity capital to finance government-mandated changes. In both situations,
the contractor is unable to use capital which it would have had but for the
acts of the Government. In the case of invested equity capital, the contractor should be able to recover the interest that might have been earned on
that capital for the same reasons that interest is allowed on the principal
amount of a claim.
The Court of Claims' reluctance to award imputed interest is also influenced by an apparent fear that without more stringent safeguards, the contractor may receive a windfall. Although the Board's use of the "jury
verdict" method 96 in the absence of specific proofs should serve as a fair
and reasonable means of arriving at an equitable figure, a more conservative approach could be adopted if the Court of Claims is uncomfortable
with more than a limited amount of discretion vested in the triers of fact at
the Board level. Recovery of imputed interest could be limited to instances in which the contractor can prove that its investments in government-caused changes were reasonable, necessary, and specifically allocable
94.
95.
Stat. 97
96.

See note 10 supra.
ASPR § 7-104.82, 32 C.F.R. § 7-104.82 (1976) (referring to Pub. L. No. 92-41, 85
(July 1, 1971)).
See note 63 supra.

Catholic University Law Review

[Vol. 28:359

to the changes. Thus, adoption of a simple and logical system of recovery
can avoid the egregious inequity suffered by the self-financing contractor.
IV.

CONCLUSION

In the evolution of government contract law, the restrictions on interest
allowance gradually have become more relaxed. The most recent development in this area, however, curtails the Board's progress toward more equitable treatment of the contractor who invests its own money in
government-caused changes.
Both the Court of Claims and the Board of Contract Appeals recognize
that the issue is a sensitive one. Finding that unequal awards for debt and
equity capital are inherently unfair, the Board sought to support its award
of imputed interest with fragmentary evidence. The cases it cited illustrate
the Board's dissatisfaction with the double standard of recovery. No precedent, however, directly supports the result reached by the Board in its
most recent attempts to resolve the problem. In contrast, the Court of
Claims tightened the reins on recovery of imputed interest because an adequate method of computation had not been demonstrated.
The basic dilemma may have received only a temporary resolution. The
court in Singer gingerly espoused the Framlau rejection of imputed interest allowance. Moreover, no cases to date have followed in its wake to
analyze the equities of the double standard of recovery. Should the Board
offer an acceptable standard for computing imputed interest and tighten
the standards of proof required for recovery, the Court of Claims may
abandon its restrictive policy and equalize the treatment of borrowing and
investing contractors.
Amy Crean Corn

